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EUrope’s Uneven Geographies of Reception 
Excess, Differentiation, and Struggles in the Government of Asylum Seekers 
 
The article takes EUrope’s uneven geographies of reception as a privileged 
standpoint from which to explore the ways in which EUrope is currently produced 
through the management of asylum seekers, as well as constantly contested by 
asylum seekers’ movements. Drawing from qualitative research in Italy and 
Sweden, the article calls into question the notion of a homogeneous EUrope that 
is promoted by EU asylum policies through the idea of a common area of 
protection in which asylum seekers are treated equally and fairly regardless of the 
place of reception. Such presumed homogeneity is radically challenged by an 
excess of contexts of reception, which is explored along spatial, institutional, and 
temporal lines, and by excessive movements, through which migrants attempt to 
take advantage of the unevenness characterising the EUropean space. The article 
argues that an emphasis on the excess of reception and on the excessive character 
of movements points to possible ways for rethinking Europe in terms in which 
unevenness is replaced by equal possibilities, living conditions, and welfare. 
 
Keywords: harmonisation of reception conditions; relocation; excess of 
reception; excessive movements; spatial unevenness. 
 
1. Introduction1 
 
On 19th of April 2015, one of the largest shipwreck in the recent history of the 
Mediterranean Sea occurred. A boat with more than 800 people aboard, including 
children, capsized 100 km off the Libyan coast and only 28 people survived in what has 
been described as the deadliest incident concerning migrant boats in the Mediterranean 																																																								
1 This article is based on research fieldwork which was carried out during my PhD at the University 
of Warwick, Department of Politics and International Studies. I would therefore like to thank the Warwick 
Graduate School for funding my PhD through a Chancellor’s Scholarship as well as the Department of 
Politics and International Studies for providing financial support for my research trips. I am particularly 
grateful for helpful feedback from the guest editors of this special issue and from one anonymous reviewer. 
I also wish to thank Vicki Squire and Maurice Stierl for their insightful comments on earlier versions of the 
article. 
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Sea to date (Bonomolo, Kirchgaessner, 2015). Only a few days before, on 13th April, 
another boat had sunk in the same area, causing the death of about 400 people (Scherer, 
Jones, 2015). In response to these tragic events, several summits of the institutions of the 
European Union (EU) followed one another in a quite short period of time, leading to the 
adoption of the European Agenda on Migration on 13th May 2015 (European 
Commission, 2015). The Agenda on Migration outlined a EUropean2 response to what 
the European Commission framed as a “crisis situation”3. Such a response was organised 
around a comprehensive approach including measures for fighting against smugglers and 
traffickers; strengthening return policy; strengthening border controls; cooperating with 
countries of origin and transit; fully implementing asylum policies; and reforming 
policies on legal migration. 
Besides defining some guidelines for the future, the Agenda on Migration also 
called for some immediate actions to be adopted to tackle the “crisis”4. In the domain of 
the reception of asylum seekers5, which is the one explored by this article, the most 
																																																								
2 Following the example of Maurice Stierl (2017a), the article adopts the terms “EUrope” and 
“EUropean” in order to problematise the widespread equation between the EU and Europe and vice-versa. 
This is also intended to emphasise that “EUrope is not reducible to the institutions of the EU” (Stierl, 2017a, 
p. 18). Along these lines, it is important to keep in mind that the EU does not coincide with Europe and it 
is rather “the most recent political project to speak in the name of Europe” (Walters, Haahr, 2005, p. 4, 
italics in the original). I will adopt the term “Europe” in relation to the attempt to rethink it, thereby 
suggesting a move beyond the EU. Besides that, the very idea of “Europe”, as a more or less homogeneous 
unit that can be clearly distinguished from the “non-European” rest, also needs to be called into question. 
There is no space for developing this critique here, but please refer to recent works on what Nicholas De 
Genova calls the “European Question” for a fuller discussion (De Genova, 2016; Tazzioli, De Genova, 
2016).  
3 The term “crisis” is in inverted commas in order to question the presumed objective nature of 
“crises”. In this way, I follow some analyses of the relationship between crisis and migration, which draw 
attention to the discursive and non-discursive practices through which “crises” are literally produced in 
contraposition to a supposed ordinary situation (Nyers, 2006; De Genova, Tazzioli, 2016; Pallister-Wilkins, 
2016; Jeandesboz, Pallister-Wilkins, 2016). 
4 These actions are the strengthening of Frontex joint operations Triton and Poseidon; the adoption 
of a temporary distribution mechanism for the allocation of asylum seekers; the establishment of a EU-
wide resettlement scheme for 20,000 places; and the definition of a Common Security and Defence Policy 
operation in the Mediterranean against traffickers and smugglers. 
5 Given the focus on reception policies and practices, the article primarily refers to “asylum 
seekers” and only speaks of “beneficiaries of international protection” when referring to people with 
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important development concerned the definition of a relocation mechanism intended to 
distribute asylum seekers within the EU in a more equitable way. Relocation represents 
a temporary derogation to what is probably the key element of the whole Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS); namely, the principle of the first country of entry 
which is encapsulated by the Dublin system6. According to this principle, the member 
state through which an asylum seeker enters the EU is the one in charge for processing 
the asylum application and providing adequate support to the applicant in compliance 
with the directive on reception conditions7. Unsurprisingly, a prominent effect of the 
Dublin system has been an excessive pressure on member states at the southern external 
borders of the EU, which inevitably represent the first destination for those arriving in the 
EU8. To relieve pressure from these countries, relocation is meant to identify exceptional 
situations in which asylum seekers can be transferred from the first country of entry to 
another member state.  
The definition of a relocation mechanism was welcomed by policymakers as a 
fundamental step in reforming the CEAS (European Commission, 2016a) and going 
beyond the Dublin system (Pelosi, 2015; Ricciardelli, 2015). Unlike these accounts, this 
article situates relocation in continuity with the overall rationale that has hitherto 
underlain the CEAS, which is based on the harmonisation of reception conditions as a 
																																																								
refugee status or subsidiary protection or a form of protection based on humanitarian grounds. The more 
comprehensive term “migrant” is used to include also people who are neither asylum seekers nor 
beneficiaries of international protection, such as rejected asylum seekers, people who become “irregular” 
for other reasons, and people who have not claimed asylum yet. For the sake of clarity, I had to use these 
legal categories even if they are based upon an artificial distinction between forced and voluntary migration 
which does not correspond to social reality and therefore needs to be called into question (Crawley, 
Skleparis, 2017). 
6 I use the expression “Dublin system” to refer to the principle of allocation of responsibility for 
an asylum application to the first country of entry, which underpins the Dublin Convention signed in 1990 
and the resulting regulations (so-called Dublin II regulation adopted in 2003 and the recast regulation 
adopted in 2013). It is possible to include these different instruments under the label of “Dublin system” 
because the main principles of the 1990 Convention have been maintained in the following acts.  
7 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying 
down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast). 
8 This is due to the nearly total lack of legal ways to arrive to the EU. Because of that, the only 
option for most of the world’s non-Western population is to travel to the EU in an irregular way and then 
regularise the legal position by applying for asylum. 
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tool for managing mobility. In this respect, relocation is thus consistent with previous 
attempts to govern asylum seekers based on the fiction of the smooth and even space of 
the “common area of protection” (European Council, 2010). As it is further specified in 
the following pages, the idea of a common area of protection describes a space in which 
asylum seekers are offered equivalent reception conditions regardless of the place in 
which they are received, thus projecting EUrope as a unit that is homogeneous and even.  
Drawing from qualitative research in local contexts of reception in Italy and 
Sweden, this article calls into question such presumed homogeneity by focusing on the 
excess of reception. With this expression, I refer to the sheer heterogeneity of practices 
and experiences of reception existing in the EU, despite institutional efforts to present 
reception as an abstract and fixed procedure which can be replicated across the EU 
regardless of local contexts. In particular, the excess of reception is explored in relation 
to three analytical dimensions, which are the spatial, institutional, and temporal 
dimensions. These dimensions expose the fragmentation and unevenness characterising 
the EUropean space, thus challenging the notion of a homogeneous EUrope which 
underpins the idea of a common area of protection. If, on the one hand, the above-
mentioned dimensions of excess operate as mechanisms of differentiation through which 
asylum seekers are governed in the EU, on the other hand, EUrope’s unevenness is 
constantly appropriated by asylum seekers’ excessive movements which therefore 
produce EUrope as a space of conflict in which mobility is a key element9. 
In line with the theme of this special issue on “rethinking Europe”, the analysis of 
the reception of asylum seekers in the EU is used as a point of entry for reflecting more 
broadly on the EUropean project and on possible ways for radically rethinking it. In other 
words, the article takes EUrope’s uneven geographies of reception as a privileged 
standpoint from which to explore the ways in which EUrope is currently produced 
through the management of asylum seekers, as well as constantly contested by asylum 
seekers’ movements. The questions that the article seeks to address are therefore: What 
is the idea of EUrope that underpins the CEAS? What idea of EUrope emerges when 
viewed through the practices that govern asylum seekers in the EUropean space? How 
does the analysis of reception help us to rethink Europe?  
Before addressing these questions, the next section offers some preliminary 
methodological clarifications and provides details about fieldwork, research techniques, 																																																								
9 For a discussion of the idea of excess in relation to migration, see Stierl (2017b).  
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and the choice of case studies (section 2). Section 3 addresses the first two research 
questions mentioned above by exploring the “ideological projection of a singular, unified 
Europe” (De Genova 2016) that is put forward by the CEAS. The following two sections 
move on to show how such projection is radically called into question by an excess of 
contexts of reception (section 4) and by excessive movements (section 5). By connecting 
the reception of asylum seekers and a critical reflection on the question of EUrope, the 
article contributes to two different, yet related, bodies of literature. First, the article 
contributes to the field of critical border and migration studies (Casas-Cortes et al, 2015) 
by focusing specifically on aspects of the EU border regime that have not gathered enough 
attention so far, like reception and relocation. In this respect, the following reflections 
also speak to the special issue on the experiences of asylum seekers and the forms of 
control targeting them in the EU, which was edited by Elena Fontanari and Barbara Pinelli 
for this journal in 2017 (Fontanari, Pinelli, 2017). 
Second, the article also intends to call into question the presumed “givenness of 
this Europe” (Walters, Haahr, 2005, p. 2) by posing EUrope as a question rather than 
assuming it as a taken for granted point of reference. In this way, it contributes to studies 
which have tried to destabilise assumed interpretations of EUrope (Walters, Haahr, 2005; 
De Genova, Tazzioli, 2016). In particular, it suggests that the analysis of the practices 
governing asylum seekers in the EUropean space and the forms of mobility which subvert 
such governmental attempts offers a useful support for rethinking Europe in terms in 
which differentiation and unevenness are replaced by equal possibilities, living 
conditions, and welfare. 
 
2. Preliminary methodological remarks 
 
The article draws from fieldwork which was carried out as part of my PhD in several 
locations in Italy and Sweden between January 2015 and February 2016. The two 
countries were chosen because of their significance in the current EU politics of migration 
management. Indeed, both countries are key sites of migration which were receiving 
substantial numbers of asylum seekers when I began my PhD in 2013. In particular, they 
received 19% of the EU’s total asylum applications in 2013 (Eurostat, 2014), 23% in 
2014 (Eurostat, 2015) and 19% in 2015 (Eurostat, 2016). Moreover, while Italy is 
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regularly one of the main points of entry to the EU10, Sweden is often one of the EU 
countries with the highest percentage of asylum seekers per population. More 
specifically, Sweden was the first EU member state with respect to the number of asylum 
applicants per million inhabitants in 2013 and 2014, and it was only overcome by 
Hungary in 2015. In these years, as Eurostat reports demonstrate, the percentage of 
asylum seekers received by Sweden exceeded by far that of most other EU states 
(Eurostat, 2014; 2015; 2016). 
 Despite the shared importance when it comes to the number of applications 
received, Italy and Sweden present fundamental differences among themselves which 
heavily differentiate their role within the CEAS. These differences concern the 
geographical position of the two countries, which translates to different ways of entry for 
incoming asylum seekers and in turn to different concerns informing the organisation of 
reception policies; the history and consolidation of the respective reception policies; the 
involvement of state and local authorities in the provision of reception; the organisation 
of welfare measures and the consequent type of support offered to asylum seekers and 
beneficiaries of international protection beyond the mere provision of reception. While 
the share of asylum seekers received in Italy and Sweden guarantees their relevance as 
countries of reception in numerical terms, the differences between the two provide a 
strong basis for generalising diagnoses drawn out from phenomena and issues that are 
identified in both contexts. In this way, the similarities that connect diverse contexts 
within the two countries are interpreted as possible trends that cut across localities and 
are therefore ascribable to EU-wide dynamics, as in the case of the excess of reception 
and the consequent role of differentiation in the government of asylum seekers.  
 The choice of contexts within Italy and Sweden was equally driven by the 
necessity to combine representativeness and diversity in order to identify phenomena 
whose scope could be deemed general rather than context-specific. Following this intent, 
the sites that I visited are: Bologna, Bolzano, Caltagirone, Catania, Gothenburg, Kiruna, 
Lampedusa, Malmö, Milano, Palermo, Pozzallo, Rome, Siracusa, and Stockholm. These 
places were identified in order to ensure a degree of variety between reception measures 
provided in cities, towns and remote areas; as well as between places of arrival, transit 																																																								
10 See for example data provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5205; and by the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) at http://migration.iom.int/europe/. 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and destination. Local contexts were also selected with the aim of gathering information 
about different types of reception existing in the two countries, including emergency 
reception measures.  
In these locations, I carried out 30 in-depth semi-structured interviews with a 
range of different actors in order to explore broader political processes investing the 
management of reception in the EU. Hence, the focus was not on local contexts in 
themselves, but on the ways through which they speak to EU-wide dynamics. The list of 
interviewees includes: activists providing legal advice to migrants as well as monitoring 
reception conditions; team leaders and case-workers at Arbetsförmedlingen11 (Swedish 
Public Employment Service); team leaders and reception officers at Migrationsverket12 
(Swedish Migration Agency); a governmental official responsible for local emergency 
reception measures in an Italian Prefettura13 (Prefecture); NGO workers providing legal 
and psychological support to asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection; 
social workers and project managers working within the national System for the 
Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR) as well as in Centri di accoglienza 
straordinaria (CAS – Extraordinary Reception Centres) in diverse Italian locations; and 
volunteers providing various types of support to migrants. The interviews were organised 
around some main themes, such as: features of reception measures provided to asylum 
seekers in the local context, forms of support for those who are granted protection, 
shortcomings affecting measures towards asylum seekers and beneficiaries of 
international protection, and peculiarities of local contexts. Within this general 
																																																								
11 Arbetsförmedlingen is the Swedish agency in charge of ensuring the matching between 
jobseekers and employers as well as supporting jobseekers through labour market programmes. Since the 
reform of integration policies introduced by the Swedish Introduction Act of 2010, the agency is also 
responsible for support programs (etableringsplan) for beneficiaries of international protection. 
12 Migrationsverket is the Swedish central administrative authority in the domains of asylum, 
migration, and citizenship. With respect to asylum, Migrationsverket’s duties include the processing of 
asylum applications as well as the provision of financial support, information, and housing to asylum 
seekers. It is therefore the agency in charge with the reception of asylum seekers in Sweden.  
13 Prefettura, also known as Ufficio territoriale del governo (Local government office), is the local 
branch of Ministero dell’Interno (Ministry of the Interior) and represents the state in each province. It deals 
with migration, asylum, security, and public order. With respect to reception, Prefetture are in charge of 
Centri di accoglienza straordinaria (CAS), which are emergency reception measures whose features are 
discussed in section 4.  
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framework, the outline of each interview was tailored to the interviewee in order to get 
the most out of the specific competences and strengths of everyone.  
Despite the lack of long periods of participant observation, my methodological 
approach implied an “ethnographic sensibility” (Shore, Wright, 2011, p. 15) given that 
immersion stood for a crucial technique of data generation as it happens with 
ethnography. However, in line with Gregory Feldman’s idea of “nonlocal ethnography” 
(2011, p. 33), I suggest that my research involved an immersion in a space of 
governmentality (Tazzioli 2015) aimed at decoding the functioning of an apparatus of 
power, as opposed to an immersion in a specific place or institution in order to study its 
daily life. Such a space of governmentality can therefore be imagined as a “spatially 
dispersed field through which the ethnographer moves – actually, via sojourns in two or 
more places, or conceptually, by means of techniques of juxtaposition of data” (Falzon, 
2009, p. 2). In this respect, if local reception practices are to be addressed as part of 
broader configurations of power targeting asylum seekers, then the study of these 
practices in different locations accounts for an immersion in the same space of 
governmentality, which I define elsewhere as EU reception regime (Vianelli, 2017). To 
some extent, it can therefore be argued that the geographical breadth of the research 
“produce[s] a new kind of conceptual depth” (Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013, p. 10).  
Furthermore, it is important to stress how my immersion in the EU reception 
regime started well before the fieldwork that I carried out for my PhD thesis, given my 
previous research (Vianelli, 2011) and a two-and-a-half-year work experience in a social 
cooperative providing support to asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international 
protection in an Italian town (Vianelli, 2014a; 2014b). Besides that, my immersion in the 
discourses, policies, and practices targeting asylum seekers in the EU has also been 
strengthened by the membership in the association Asilo in Europa14. This provided a 
constant connection with the “ground” by allowing me to stay in touch and share 
reflections with social workers and practitioners who work in several contexts within the 
EU. Hence, as long as time is one of the main variables through which a researcher 
																																																								
14 Asilo in Europa is an NGO based in Italy but including members who work, study and research 
in different EU countries. The main activities of the association include: advocacy; research on Italian and 
EU asylum law, member states’ reception systems and best practices; country of origin information; 
training for social workers and practitioners dealing with asylum seekers; organisation of seminars and 
workshops.  
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achieves ethnographic depth (Falzon, 2009, p. 7), this set of different experiences can be 
intended as replacing the ethnographic depth that would have otherwise been produced 
by long-term participant observation in one or more locations.  
The immersion that I have just described, combined with the analysis of different 
types of data including policy documents, administrative guidelines, newspaper articles, 
press releases, speeches, and blogs, proved to be a fundamental source of triangulation, 
which allowed me to not rely uniquely on interviews. All these documents, as Annelise 
Riles suggests, “are also paradigmatic artifacts of ethnographic research” (Riles, 2006, p. 
6), and their analysis as “ethnographic objects” (Riles, 2006, p. 7) therefore contributed 
to the ethnographic sensibility that I mentioned above. The next section is predominantly 
based on legal and policy documents relating to the CEAS and is necessary to provide the 
overall framework for the investigation that follows in sections 4 and 5. 
  
3. The supposed smooth space of the common area of protection 
 
Ironically, the heyday of the “refugee crisis”, when unprecedented numbers of people 
succeeded to cross EU borders without authorisation, almost coincided with the 
completion of the CEAS. Indeed, July 2015 was the deadline by which member states 
were required to transpose the recast Reception Conditions Directive (RCD 2013) and 
the recast Asylum Procedures Directive into national laws15. The adoption of these two 
legal instruments brought to an end a process of harmonisation of reception conditions, 
asylum procedures, and refugee status, begun at the European Council meeting of 
Tampere in October 1999. In Tampere, the heads of state or government of EU member 
states agreed on the creation of a CEAS with the goal of defining “a common asylum 
procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum” (European Council, 
1999, p. 4). The CEAS is formed by a set of legal instruments which constitute the 
architecture of the EU asylum policy. Besides the two directives mentioned above, the 
other legal instruments are: the recast Qualification Directive16; the Dublin III 																																																								
15 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying 
down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) and Directive 
2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for 
granting and withdrawing international protection (recast). 
16 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international 
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Regulation17; the recast EURODAC Regulation18; and the Regulation establishing the 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO)19. 
Despite the appearance of an endeavour meant to enhance rights and guarantees 
for asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection, the whole process of 
harmonisation of asylum policies can be interpreted as part of a broader politics of 
migration management intended to govern the new borderless area created by the 
Schengen Agreement. The Dublin system is a key pillar of such politics of migration 
management as it has compensated the abolition of internal border controls with forms of 
rebordering specifically addressed to asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international 
protection (Guild, 2006). The rationale of the Dublin system is twofold. On the one hand, 
it aims to prevent so-called “asylum shopping”, that is to say multiple asylum applications 
lodged by a single individual in different member states. On the other hand, the objective 
of the Dublin system is to reduce asylum seekers’ mobility by preventing them from 
deciding where to lodge their claim and consequently where to be received. Hence, the 
Dublin system excludes asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection from 
the right to move and settle freely in the Schengen area.   
The subordinate position of harmonisation in comparison with the goal of 
managing mobility is explicit in some of the legislative acts forming the CEAS. For 
example, recital 12 of RCD 2013 states that “[t]he harmonisation of conditions for the 
reception of applicants should help to limit the secondary movements of applicants 
influenced by the variety of conditions for their reception”20. Such an association between 																																																								
protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the 
content of the protection granted (recast). 
17 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a 
stateless person (recast). 
18 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, 
on the establishment of Eurodac for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of 
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (recast). 
19 Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 
establishing a European Asylum Support Office. 
20 In the EU jargon, a “secondary movement” occurs when (prospective) asylum seekers or 
beneficiaries of international protection move without authorisation from the first country of arrival, which 
is the one in charge for their asylum claim and for the provision of reception measures. “Secondary 
	 11	
harmonisation of reception conditions and reduction of “secondary movements” was then 
reiterated in the Communication which started the reform of the CEAS in April 2016 
(European Commission, 2016b). Here, the Commission identifies the persistence of 
“secondary movements” as a major weakness of the system, which needs to be addressed 
through a greater harmonisation of reception conditions and a fairer sharing of 
responsibilities for asylum applications between member states. In this respect, the whole 
reform outlined by the Commission appears as an attempt to deepen harmonisation in 
order to reduce “secondary movements”. 
The process of harmonisation which led to the CEAS offers an interesting 
example of the ways in which the EU defines new spaces of government so as to intervene 
upon them. It can be helpful to dwell briefly on this feature of harmonisation, drawing 
from analyses which examine the policy of harmonisation through the lenses of 
governmentality (Barry, 1993; 1994; 2001 Ch. 3). Initially developed by Michel Foucault 
(2007; 2008), governmentality offers “a set of methodological and conceptual guidelines” 
(Walters, 2012, p. 40) for the study of the rationalities and technologies underpinning the 
activity of governing. In the perspective of governmentality, government is understood 
in the broad sense of “mechanisms and procedures intended to conduct men, to direct 
their conduct, to conduct their conduct” (Foucault, 2014, p. 12). In addition, by stressing 
the constitutive relation between forms of thought, knowledge and techniques of 
government, the notion of governmentality alludes to the ways in which objects of 
government are brought into being in the same process of governing. In this way, 
government is defined as a “problematizing activity” (Rose, Miller, 1992, p. 181), which 
is based upon a double movement of representation and intervention (Lemke, 2001, p. 
191). 
An interesting analysis of harmonisation through the lenses of governmentality is 
provided by Andrew Barry, whose definition of harmonisation can be fruitfully discussed 
in relation to the CEAS. Barry defines harmonisation as “both a project directed at 
reconstructing the European space in a particular form, and a means for establishing this 
space as a possible object of government” (Barry, 1993, p. 319). This definition presents 
two interconnected dimensions that are worth of consideration. Let me start with the 
																																																								
movements” is in inverted commas throughout the article to dissociate myself from such a EU-centric 
institutional jargon which disregards that several movements preceded the presumed secondary one and 
many more are likely to follow.  
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latter, which concerns the ability of the policy of harmonisation to constitute objects of 
government.  
In this respect, harmonisation is a key technique in the “governmentalisation of 
Europe” (Walters, Haahr, 2005, p. 10), whereby this expression describes the process 
through which EUrope is constituted as an object of government requiring a EU response. 
As such, harmonisation is “an essential element in the current art of European 
government” (Barry, 1994, p. 52). Indeed, a distinctive feature of the EU consists 
precisely in the attempt to constitute “Europe as a space where Europe-wide issues can 
be acted upon by agencies of the EU” (Delanty, Rumford, 2005, p. 122)21. A similar 
attempt has also marked the creation of the CEAS, whose necessity was made possible 
by the definition of the management of asylum seekers as a “EUropean problem”, 
deriving from the creation of an area of free movement and requiring a common and 
coordinated response (Walters, Haahr, 2005, Ch. 5). 
The second dimension emphasised by the definition proposed by Barry concerns 
the spatial politics at stake in the process of harmonisation. Through harmonisation, 
EUrope is constructed not only as a space to be governed by the EU, but as a space having 
a particular form, and for this reason harmonisation is also a “spatializing project” (Barry, 
2001, p. 67). Such a spatial dimension of harmonisation is particularly interesting in the 
case of the CEAS because it defines what is probably the fundamental assumption upon 
which the entire policy framework is based. Notably, the space of the harmonised CEAS 
is conceived as the smooth and even space of the “common area of protection and 
solidarity” (European Council, 2010), in which: 
 
[I]ndividuals, regardless of the member state in which their application for asylum is lodged, 
are offered an equivalent level of treatment as regards reception conditions, and the same level 
as regards procedural arrangements and status determination. 
(European Council, 2010, p. 32) 
 
Put simply, the harmonised space of the CEAS is presented as a homogenous 
space in which the contexts of reception do not matter. Accordingly, given such presumed 
homogeneity of reception conditions, asylum seekers are obliged to accept the destination 
that is imposed on them through allocation mechanisms like the Dublin system and 																																																								
21 Let us just think here at the increasing role played by EASO and the current negotiations on the 
creation of a EU Agency for Asylum. 
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relocation schemes. However, it is important to understand the smooth space of the CEAS 
not as mere ideological rhetoric or a legal-institutional reality; but, above all, as a 
“political project that endeavours to create a social reality that it suggests already exists” 
(Lemke, 2001, p. 203).  
In this respect, the governmental reason underpinning the CEAS can be compared 
to the raison d’état analysed by Foucault in his history of governmentality. For Foucault, 
raison d’état was the first art of government specific to the state and it defined “the state 
as both its principle and its objective, as both its foundation and its aim” (Foucault, 2007, 
p. 286). The state was both a principle of intelligibility through which raison d’état 
addressed a set of practices and institutions and a goal of the art of government 
encapsulated by raison d’état. A similar governmental reason can be seen operating in 
the smooth space of the CEAS as well. Indeed, just like the state for raison d’état, the 
supposed common area of protection is at the same time a given to which specific 
measures refer (e.g. the Dublin system and relocation) and an objective to be constructed. 
In other words, the homogenous space of the common area of protection appears “at once 
that which exists, but which does not yet exist enough” (Foucault, 2008, p. 4). 
Relocation measures introduced in the wake of the European Agenda on 
Migration confirm such projection of a singular and smooth space in which the specificity 
of local contexts is erased. Relocation provides for cases in which asylum seekers who 
are deemed “in clear need of protection” – those belonging to nationalities which have a 
minimum first instance recognition rate of 75% across the EU – can be transferred from 
the first country of entry to another EU member state. In particular, the Council of the 
European Union adopted two decisions in September 2015 providing for the relocation 
of 40.000 and 120.000 “persons in clear need of protection” from Greece and Italy22. 
These measures are therefore a temporary derogation to the Dublin system and are 
primarily intended to ensure a fairer distribution of asylum seekers among member states 																																																								
22 The first is Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece, while the second is 
Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. The latter decision initially included Hungary, 
which decided not to take part in the scheme. Moreover, in September 2016, 54.000 places on the total 
amount of 160.000 were dedicated to the relocation of Syrians nationals from Turkey according to the 
infamous EU-Turkey deal. The remaining places were divided in the following way: 66.400 people had to 
be relocated from Greece and 39.600 people from Italy. 
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according to a distribution key calculated on the size of the population, the gross domestic 
product, the average number of asylum applications per one million inhabitants over the 
period 2010-2014, and unemployment rate.  
Two years after the adoption of these decisions, with the end of September 2017 
as the target date for the conclusion of the relocation scheme, relocation is far from living 
up to the initial goals given that only 27,700 people were relocated as of 4 September 
2017 (European Commission, 2017, p. 2). However, my intention here is not to explore 
the reasons for such failure, but rather to stress that relocation does not call into question 
the overall paradigm upon which the CEAS is based. Indeed, despite the supposed 
reforming character, relocation preserves the presumption of the feasibility of an orderly 
management of asylum seekers to be achieved through their allocation to a member state 
without their will being considered. In this way, relocation continues the objectification 
of asylum seekers, who are imagined as objects that can be moved from one place to 
another according to criteria that respond to states’ concerns. Furthermore, the idea of 
unity and homogeneity characterising the common area of protection is reproduced by 
relocation schemes, as they impose the country of destination on the basis of a presumed 
equivalence of reception conditions across the EU. Yet, such a homogeneity is heavily 
called into question by the situation on the ground, as the next section shows.  
 
4. The excess of contexts of reception 
 
In line with anthropological analyses of reception practices (Van Aken, 2008; Sorgoni, 
2011a; 2011b; Pinelli 2013; 2015), I understand reception as a social practice which is 
embodied in specific encounters and entangled in specific contexts. To speak of reception 
practices involves an attention to the “localised, everyday, human, and thus unique, 
dimension” (Urru, 2011, p. 63) of the encounters that shape the provision of reception. In 
this perspective, despite the institutional attempt to present it as an abstract procedure that 
can be replicated in all member states, reception appears as constitutively in excess as it 
is open to multiple forms across as well as within states. Stated in different terms, what I 
suggest is a kind of “spatial turn” in relation to reception, to be pursued through an 
emphasis on the role of local contexts in the management of asylum seekers. 
 The focus on local contexts of reception reveals a great degree of fragmentation 
and heterogeneity, thus destabilising the projection of homogeneity put forward by the 
CEAS. Moreover, the acknowledgement of the excessive character of contexts of 
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reception invites us to move beyond the “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer, Glick 
Schiller, 2003), which often characterises studies of the reception of asylum seekers. 
Indeed, despite the relevance of member states in terms of institutional setting and 
transposition of EU directives, a national frame of analysis is inadequate to analyse what 
appears as a EU-wide regime of management of asylum seekers which operates by 
differentiating conditions and experiences both within and across national borders. For 
these reasons, it is misleading to refer to an “Italian reception system” or a “Swedish 
reception system”, as these are reifications that obliterate the extreme heterogeneity 
which informs reception at the level of practices, experiences, and local arrangements. 
Along these lines, my decision to carry out fieldwork in two countries should not be 
associated with the intention to propose a comparison between presumed “national 
systems”, because that would fail to account for the heterogeneity of forms of reception 
that exists even within the same country.  
The importance of contexts in the field of asylum seekers’ reception is aptly 
pointed out by the ethnographic study of Heath Cabot who examines an Athens-based 
NGO assisting asylum seekers (Cabot, 2013). Cabot highlights to what extent Greece is 
considered by both asylum seekers and NGO workers “as a kind of liminal geography, a 
perasma (passing-point), a Europe that is not Europe” (2013, p. 149). Similarly, the belief 
that some places are more EUropean than others became quite clear to me as well, during 
my previous work experience in a project in charge of assisting asylum seekers and 
beneficiaries of international protection in a northern Italian town. Indeed, a significant 
number of the people that I met were quite determined to quit the support program and 
move to “EUrope”, as from their point of view the poor reception conditions and scarce 
job opportunities did not allow Italy to qualify itself as fully EUropean. 
 Notwithstanding the process of harmonisation started in Tampere, these examples 
remind us that EUrope is far from being a smooth space from the perspective of asylum 
seekers. A great heterogeneity results from the excess of reception, which materialises 
through a multiplicity of practices, institutional arrangements, local configurations, and 
forms of implementation. Such a heterogeneous excess undermines the very foundation 
upon which the CEAS is based: namely, the assumption that asylum seekers are offered 
an equivalent level of treatment regardless of the place in which they are assisted. I 
suggest that the heterogeneity of reception makes the presumed common area of 
protection look like a machine of differentiation, whose function is to multiply asylum 
seekers’ experiences along spatial, institutional, and temporal lines. It is precisely along 
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spatial, institutional, and temporal lines that I would like to draw out three dimensions by 
which I will briefly analyse processes of differentiation at stake in the ways asylum 
seekers are governed through reception in the EU.  
 
4.1. Spatial differentiation 
 
The first dimension of differentiation that needs to be considered is the spatial one. 
Reception is experienced very differently according to the geographical location where it 
takes place. Besides the support provided within reception centres, it needs to be 
acknowledged that different locations are differentially equipped for assisting asylum 
seekers due to a whole set of reasons which might include: the availability of training 
opportunities and language courses; the quality of healthcare services; the provision of 
specialised care for people with specific needs, such as victims of torture or traumatised 
people; and the availability of social support measures beyond those specifically aimed 
at asylum seekers. These differences were very clear to a governmental official in charge 
of local emergency reception measures, whom I interviewed in an Italian Prefettura. 
While discussing the features of several CAS that were managed by Prefettura in the 
area, the governmental official admitted how:  
 
Big cities offer much more opportunities in comparison with smaller places. Let us think for 
example at Italian language classes. In all the reception centres that we run, there are Italian 
modules organised by the organisation that manages the facility […] But, clearly, asylum 
seekers that are based in the city are also enrolled in other courses organised by different 
actors in the city, which are free. Hence, if they want to seize this opportunity they can, while 
those asylum seekers living in small villages across the province cannot. […] There, the local 
context offers less options.  
(Interview with an official from Prefettura, August 2015, my italics) 
 
Such a disparity between cities and more remote areas is even more pressing in a 
country like Sweden, which is very vast but has a low population density. Consequently, 
some locations in which asylum seekers are received are extremely isolated and this can 
affect negatively the provision of reception measures. “If you are in the middle of 
Sweden, somewhere where you have to drive 50 km to get to the next house, that can be 
a really big problem” (Interview with a case-worker from Arbetsförmedlingen, January 
2015). This is what I was told by a case-worker from Arbetsförmedlingen, whose task 
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was to follow beneficiaries of international protection benefitting from the two-year 
introduction plan that is discussed in sub-section 4.3. The case-worker continued by 
observing that the main problems in remote areas concern the lack of “opportunities for 
work or access to Swedish language courses”; both of which are not issues in the city in 
which she works. There, instead, the primary problem concerns the scarcity of housing 
which complicates asylum seekers’ trajectories after being granted protection, thus 
highlighting the long-term consequences of contexts of reception that are discussed below 
in relation to temporal differentiation.  
All these aspects are crucial and draw attention to the contextual dimension of 
reception, which tends to be obliterated by the policy of harmonisation and its related 
narrative of a common area of protection. Far from being a neutral and abstract procedure, 
reception is deeply contingent on the context in which it takes shape, thus calling into 
question the very feasibility of harmonisation. Paraphrasing the description provided by 
Christina Boswell and Andrew Geddes in relation to migration policy, I argue that 
reception policy is not just about reception because other factors that influence the 
provision of reception need to be taken into account (cfr Boswell, Geddes, 2011, p. 20). 
As the quotes above suggest, these factors include welfare provisions, healthcare services, 
housing policies, levels of wealth, and features of labour markets. These domains are 
anything but homogenised in the current EUropean conjuncture, thus revealing an 
unevenness which is exemplary of the uneven geographical development which 
characterises the EU (Hadjimichalis, 2011). Given the contextual character of reception, 
“EU’s uneven geography” (Heller et al, 2016, p. 14) inevitably affects the space of the 
common area of protection as well, making it fundamentally uneven. For these reasons, 
it is possible to speak of EU’s uneven geographies of reception. Unevenness, however, 
should also be traced within each single context as the next sub-section shows.  
 
4.2. Institutional differentiation 
 
The spatial dimension alone is unable to account for the multiple possibilities of reception 
that exist even within the same location, as such a multiplicity can be the effect of a 
second dimension of differentiation, which I define as institutional differentiation. 
Indeed, reception can be experienced in highly diverse ways because of different 
institutional arrangements, relating for instance to the type of facility and the nature of 
those managing it. Facilities include private accommodations, collective centres, and 
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temporary facilities created through the conversion of hotels, bed and breakfasts, former 
schools, and former hospitals. As concerns the managers of facilities, they can be public 
bodies like Migrationsverket, non-profit organisations like those running several SPRAR 
projects, or even private profit-making actors, which are involved in emergency reception 
both in Italy and Sweden. Let me explore institutional differentiation by discussing how 
it plays out in the two countries that I visited during my fieldwork. 
 In Sweden, it is possible to identify two main forms of “ordinary” reception: 
Anläggningboende (ABO – facility accommodation) and Eget boende (EBO – private 
accommodation). ABO consists in accommodation directly managed by 
Migrationsverket, in which asylum seekers are distributed according to a dispersal 
scheme based on the availability of places at the national level. ABO includes rental 
apartments, transit centres, and collective reception facilities. By contrast, EBO involves 
private accommodation and relates to asylum seekers’ possibility to live with relatives or 
friends by providing an address to Migrationsverket. In the case of EBO, asylum seekers 
remain under Migrationsverket’s responsibility and are required to be available for the 
agency, but they have nonetheless the possibility to choose where to live as long as they 
are able to find somewhere to stay. 
Without going too much into detail, two main differences between ABO and EBO 
can be identified. The first difference concerns the possibility to choose where to live that 
is offered by EBO, which often represents the only option to live in a city, given that 
Migrationsverket tends to run reception facilities outside main urban contexts. In 
Gothenburg, Malmö, and Stockholm, for example, there were very few ABO options at 
the time of my fieldwork and therefore asylum seekers who wanted to live there were 
obliged to find their own accommodation. In the previous sub-section, I emphasised how 
the geographical location might have an impact on the reception of asylum seekers 
through the availability or lack of opportunities. Hence, the allocation of ABO facilities 
outside urban centres is not simply a logistical matter because it also works as a 
mechanism which differentiates reception conditions and provides an unequal access to 
opportunities on the basis of one’s ability to locate one’s own accommodation. In 
addition, this also shows very clearly that spatial and institutional dimensions of processes 
of differentiation intersect rather than operating in isolation.  
The second difference between ABO and EBO concerns dimensions and 
typologies of facilities. Several reception officers that I met admitted that they would 
prefer renting apartments instead of big centres, as apartments ensure greater 
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independence and a “more humane way to live” for asylum seekers. However, this is not 
always the case and Migrationsverket also resorted to big facilities at the time of my 
fieldwork, which were significantly called “camps” by asylum seekers. In these facilities, 
besides being subject to a specific code of conduct, concerning for instance the possibility 
to have guests or to smoke in the premises, asylum seekers might also have to share a 
room with other people, thus enjoying a limited degree of privacy and autonomy. 
With respect to Italy, the situation is even more fragmented, leading to extremely 
diverse experiences of reception for asylum seekers. SPRAR is the main national 
reception programme even if it has historically proved unable to accommodate all those 
in need. Its shortage of places has paved the way to the diffusion of emergency reception 
measures, such as those of Emergenza Nord-Africa (ENA – North-African Emergency), 
between April 2011 and February 2013 (Dal Zotto, 2014), and CAS from late 2013. 
SPRAR is made of local projects of assistance for asylum seekers, beneficiaries of 
international protection and beneficiaries of protection on humanitarian grounds, 
managed by third-sector actors in partnership with local authorities. These projects 
normally provide accommodation in apartments or small reception centres, as well as a 
whole lot of activities including legal advice, financial support, career counselling, and 
psychological support. However, despite the common institutional framework, projects 
present significant differences between themselves depending on the organisation or 
cooperative which is in charge of the activities, as there might be differences in relation 
to experience, skills, working methods, and dedication. Due to these disparities, asylum 
seekers might therefore be offered different types of support, which are also characterised 
by different degrees of quality, in a very random manner. 
Furthermore, the long-standing shortage of places in SPRAR facilities has obliged 
many asylum seekers to spend the whole period of the asylum procedure in other 
facilities, which normally present lower qualitative standards. As concerns “ordinary” 
reception measures, these facilities are Centri di accoglienza per richiedenti asilo, the so-
called CARA (Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers), which are first-reception centres 
run by organisations contracted by Ministero dell’Interno. CARA often consists of huge, 
crumbling buildings situated at the outskirts of cities or near border points, and they are 
often overcrowded and lacking or providing inadequate healthcare and legal support, as 
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it has been denounced by several reports by the campaign LasciateCIEntrare23 and the 
monitoring group Borderline Sicilia24. From these reports, it emerges quite clearly how 
reception conditions in CARA differ significantly from those provided within the SPRAR 
network, not only in relation to living conditions in the strict sense, but also in terms of 
legal advice, psychological support, and access to language and training courses, as these 
are not necessarily provided in CARA25.  
 
4.3. Temporal differentiation 
 
Differentiation can also be traced to a third dimension, the temporal one. By speaking of 
a temporal dimension of differentiation, my aim is to draw attention to the long-term 
effects of reception which concern the consequences over time of the Dublin system. By 
confining asylum seekers spatially and simultaneously denying the mutual recognition of 
positive asylum decisions, the Dublin system turns the first country of entry into a cage, 
the departure from which is also obstructed after the granting of protection26. Indeed, the 
lack of a mutual recognition of positive decisions between member states, combined with 
the limitations to the intra-EU mobility of beneficiaries of international protection, 
transform the first country of entry into the place in which asylum seekers are destined to 																																																								
23 LasciateCIEntrare is a campaign against administrative detention in Italy, which monitors 
conditions in detention and reception centres as well as advocating for the rights of migrants. For more 
information see: http://www.lasciatecientrare.it/. 
24 Borderline Sicilia Onlus is a non-profit organisation which monitors reception conditions, 
provides legal support to migrants, and raises awareness on the condition of migrants. For more information 
see: http://migrantsicily.blogspot.it/ 
25 In addition, in both countries, the picture has been further complicated in recent years by the 
significant adoption of temporary emergency reception measures, which I can only mention here due the 
lack of space (see Vianelli, 2017 for a detailed discussion on this topic). In many of the contexts I visited, 
temporary reception measures were set up by outsourcing the management of reception facilities to private 
profit-making contractors, who – often lacking the skills and the motivations needed for the job – had 
opened reception centres out of hotels, holiday resorts, former military barracks, former hospitals, and so 
on. As a result, this process has produced what can be defined as a second-class reception, on which basis 
asylum seekers might come across very different experiences of reception even within the same local 
context. 
26 The obstacles which hinder post-recognition movements are emphasised by Giulia Borri in 
relation to a group of beneficiaries of protection on humanitarian grounds who left Italy in search of better 
opportunities in other EU member states (Borri, 2017).  
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stay after the asylum process as well. Hence, the different types of support programs that 
each member state dedicates to beneficiaries of international protection, as well as the 
diversity of social welfare measures which they are enabled to, function as a 
differentiating tool in the management of asylum seekers.  
 The cases of Italy and Sweden offer a privileged standpoint from which to explore 
the unevenness that characterises the supposed common area of protection after the 
concession of the refugee status or the one of subsidiary protection. Such an unevenness 
is a consequence of the lack of EU obligations concerning the support of beneficiaries of 
international protection. Indeed, if on the one hand the CEAS is supposed to lead to the 
harmonisation of reception conditions, on the other hand, it does not establish measures 
to support those who are granted protection, thus leaving this domain to be regulated by 
each member state. As a result, every member state decides how to treat beneficiaries of 
international protection once they obtain their status and this works as a factor of further 
differentiation given that beneficiaries of international protection are not allowed to move 
freely and benefit from the supposed common area of protection. Hence, they experience 
very different levels of post-recognition support, depending on where they find 
themselves or, as one should better say, depending on the country of asylum that was 
imposed on them by the Dublin system. 
 So, for example, in Sweden, Arbetsförmedlingen coordinates a two-year program 
whose goal is to promote the inclusion of beneficiaries of international protection through 
the provision of a set of activities aimed at the introduction in the labour market. The 
program is called etableringsplan (introduction plan) and is offered to all beneficiaries of 
international protection aged between 20 and 64, plus those aged 18 and 19 who are 
unaccompanied, with the exception of the retired, the disabled and students. The activities 
of the program include: language classes, civic orientation, and employment preparation 
activities, such as training courses, internships, work experiences at a workplace, and 
entry recruitment incentives. In addition, the support program also provides financial 
benefits, housing benefits, as well as supplementary benefits for those with children.  
 In Italy, by contrast, not all those who receive a positive decision on the asylum 
claim are entitled to dedicated support measures and, for those who are, the type of 
support provided is far from being as comprehensive as the one in Sweden. Indeed, only 
the limited number of asylum seekers who are in the SPRAR network during the asylum 
process have the chance to benefit from the activities provided by SPRAR for further 6 
months, which can be extended in exceptional cases relating for example to health reasons 
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or the completion of a training course. During this time, along with housing and a 
financial allowance, beneficiaries of international protection should be offered language 
classes, professional training, psychological support, and job-search counselling.  
For all those hosted in CAS, instead, the situation is extremely unclear as only a 
small percentage of asylum seekers is transferred to a SPRAR project after the positive 
decision, thus having the possibility to benefit from SPRAR measures for 6 or more 
months. The problem here is that there are no clear criteria about who should be 
transferred to the SPRAR network as soon as new places become available and this leaves 
room for discretionary practices. With respect to those who are not allocated to a SPRAR 
project after the positive decision, the post-recognition treatment depends very much on 
the orientation adopted by the Prefettura which is responsible for the CAS. At the time 
of my fieldwork, very few Prefetture were following the same criteria adopted by SPRAR 
by giving asylum seekers the chance to benefit from support measures for 6 or more 
months after the positive decision. Because of the need to free spaces in reception 
facilities, most Prefetture required asylum seekers to leave accommodation centres 
shortly after the positive decision as in the case of the Prefettura that I visited: 
 
As far as we are concerned, we have opted for a procedure which is quite brutal, but which is 
nonetheless necessary because with such a pace of arrivals it is impossible not to have a quick 
turnover in the facilities. The places in reception facilities cannot be multiplied like loaves 
and fishes, if you follow me! [...] We have decided that people must leave facilities 20 days 
after their permit of stay is issued. Unless they are vulnerable people, for whom an extension 
is granted, or they have to complete something, such as an internship or a training course, in 
which case they are given enough time to complete it.  
(Interview with a governmental official in a Prefettura, August 2015) 
 
 These examples show that the presumed common area of protection can be 
experienced in extremely diverse ways depending on where an asylum seeker ends up. 
Indeed, while rejections to asylum applications are valid across the space of the CEAS, 
the same does not apply for positive decisions and beneficiaries of international protection 
need to apply for a visa if they want to settle in another member state after being granted 
protection. Hence, the effects of the contexts of reception extend well beyond processing 
times because the first country of entry turns out to be the place in which asylum seekers 
are required to stay after the positive decision. For these reasons, I contend that 
differentiation has a temporal dimension which relates to the long-term implications of 
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heterogeneous contexts of reception. Therefore, contexts of reception do matter, as some 
contexts might offer more opportunities than others, thus transforming the supposed 
smooth space of the common area of protection into a machine of differentiation, which 
imposes different conditions and future possibilities to asylum seekers without 
justification. 
 
5. Excessive movements 
 
The excess of reception discussed above is inextricably linked with a second type of 
excess, which concerns the incessant practices of movement through which asylum 
seekers and beneficiaries of international protection attempt to take advantage of the 
unevenness characterising the EUropean space. Such an excess became particularly 
evident during the “long summer of migration” in 2015 (Kasparek, Speer, 2015), when 
hundreds of thousands of people subverted the Dublin system and overcame police 
blocks, walls, and barbed wired fences across and beyond the “Balkan route”. Yet, the 
unprecedented dimension of these movements in last couple of years should not lead one 
to fall into the trap of the discourse of the “refugee crisis”. As Manuela Bojadžijev and 
Sandro Mezzadra argue, the long summer of migration rather signalled a dramatic 
acceleration of the “crisis of European migration policies” (Bojadžijev, Mezzadra, 2015), 
which had long been under way.  
The long-standing character of such crisis is demonstrated for example by several 
studies stressing the relevance of “secondary movements” well before 2015 (Schuster, 
2011a; 2011b; Cabot, 2013; Brekke, Brochmann, 2015; Borri, 2017; Fontanari, 2017). 
These movements became particularly evident in several Italian locations from the second 
half of 2013, as I could find out during my fieldwork when I tried to follow the transit of 
those who escaped fingerprinting in order not to be confined to Italy by the Dublin system. 
In particular, I visited the railway stations in Catania, Milan and Bolzano, with the aim of 
grasping forms and implications of such excessive movements. In these locations, various 
forms of support for those in transit were developed as a response to practices of 
movement, whose frequency had been growing drastically since 2013 and specifically 
after the establishment of the naval operation Mare Nostrum by the Italian government27.  																																																								
27 Mare Nostrum was a military-humanitarian operation launched by the Italian government with 
the aim of rescuing migrants as well as identifying smugglers. It was started after two huge shipwrecks 
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In Catania, I met an activist who had been involved in supporting migrants, 
predominantly Syrians, at the train station between the end of 2013 and the spring of 
2015. In that period, as the activist underlined, “there was a tacit agreement between 
institutions, according to which Syrians were let go and other migrants were stopped” 
(Interview with an activist, October 2015). Accordingly, a group of people decided to 
provide some assistance at the railway station by “distributing essential goods and 
clothes, buying phone cards, and taking people to the internet point” (Interview with an 
activist, October 2015). “We were actually providing some kind of first-reception”, the 
activist admitted (Interview with an activist, October 2015). 
The following stage in the journeys of those departing from Catania was normally 
the central train station in Milan, which meanwhile had become a crucial stop-over for 
those travelling towards northern and western Europe, given that from there it is possible 
to take trains to France, Switzerland, Austria and Germany. Since 2013, a growing 
number of people had begun to stop in the mezzanine of the railway station in order to 
have some rest, gather information on the next stages of the journey, or simply wait for 
the right moment to cross the border. The phenomenon gradually expanded to the extent 
that in the summer of 2014 a group of volunteers started providing water and food to 
those on the road. When I visited the volunteers in August 2015, they had been recently 
assigned a space near the railway station by the municipality, in which they could provide 
meals, internet access, and showers to those who needed it. Through such 
institutionalisation, however, their work had been transformed into a help-desk for 
vulnerable migrants in general, somewhat losing the previous focus on those in transit. 
Indeed, volunteers were backed up by a cooperative whose function was to register the 
migrants who still had to be fingerprinted in order to then transfer them to reception 
centres in the Milan area. 
The examples of Catania and Milan were followed by another important 
manifestation of the excessive character of movements which took place at the Brenner 
																																																								
which occurred near the island of Lampedusa on 3rd and 11th October 2013 and provoked the death of 636 
people (Tazzioli 2016). The naval operation was carried out by Marina Militare (Italian Navy) in 
partnership with Aeronautica Militare (Italian Air Force), Carabinieri (Carabinieri Corps), Guardia di 
Finanza (Italian Finance Police), Capitaneria di Porto (Italian Port Authority), Corpo Militare della Croce 
Rossa Italiana (Military Corps of the Italian Red Cross), and Polizia di Stato (Italian Police). It operated 
between 18th October 2013 and 31st October 2014. 
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border between Italy and Austria. As reported by Brenner/o Border Monitoring28 
(Saltarelli, Weissensteiner, 2015), movements on the so-called “Brenner route” acquired 
a significance relevance between 2013 and 2015, while simultaneously being 
accompanied by an increase in border controls. Border controls at Brenner can be divided 
into two types. On the one hand, mobile and non-systematic controls are implemented 
according to a bilateral agreement between Austria and Italy which dates to 199729. The 
agreement provides for the so-called “readmission” of those who are intercepted either 
within 10 kilometres from the border or in the Bolzano province (Italy) or in the Federal 
Land of Tirol (Austria), without satisfying the legal conditions for a regular entry or stay 
in the country (Saltarelli, Weissensteiner, 2015)30.  
On the other hand, there are the so-called “trilateral controls” involving police 
officers from Austria, Germany, and Italy, who operate in the Italian territory on EuroCity 
trains directed to Munich (Germany) (Statewatch 2014). In place since 2000 to fight 
against pickpockets on international trains, these patrols were strengthened and 
reorganised in November 2014 to intensify cross-border cooperation between the three 
countries. Since then, the aim of trilateral controls has become to stop undocumented 
migrants, like those who avoid fingerprinting after the arrival in Italy, as well as asylum 
seekers who lack the travel document that is required to move to another EU country. If 
controls were quite sporadic before the agreement of November 2014, they have since 
become an everyday activity, destined to ensure that as much asylum seekers as possible 
could be “taken out of trains in Italy”, as declared by Joachim Hermann, the Ministry of 
Interior of Bavaria (Statewatch 2014). 
Monika Weissensteiner, one of the founders of Brenner/o Border Monitoring, 
highlights how skin colour is normally the first criterion adopted by trilateral patrols to 
identify undocumented migrants (Weissensteiner 2015, p. 38), as I could observe myself 
while travelling towards Munich in November 2014. A few stops before the border, 																																																								
28 Brenner/o Border Monitoring is a monitoring group which was created in September 2014 to 
follow the situation in the Brenner area in relation to border controls, practices of movements, living 
conditions of those en route as well as forms of support provided. 
29 The Agreement between Italy and Austria on the readmission of people at the border (Wien, 7th 
October 1997) entered into force on 1st April 1998, that is the day after internal border controls between 
Italy and Austria were abolished following the coming into force of the Schengen Agreement. 
30 The so-called “readmissions” can be either “informal”, if they occur within 24 hours from the 
interception, or “formal”, if the time-frame extends to a maximum of 8 days. 
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Austrian police officers appeared in the coach where I was sitting and walked past me 
without saying or asking anything. As I had just heard about trilateral controls, I started 
following the situation and could see that police officers stopped three black men in the 
coach next to mine. Although they had a ticket to Munich, as I could hear from their 
complaints, they were forced to get off the train in Brixen, which is slightly less than 40 
kilometres away from the border. This brief example shows how the mechanisms of 
control impact differently on people in relation to their racialisation.   
The result of these controls was that a significant number of people was either sent 
back to Brenner, or stopped in the train stations of Brenner, Brixen, and Bolzano. Hence, 
in Brenner and Bolzano, some volunteers organised in the summer of 2014 in order to 
provide some basic support to those in transit, as for example clothes, drinks, blankets, 
and essential legal advice. Following from that, between the end of 2014 and spring 2015, 
two help-desks were opened in which migrants could stop during the daytime to have a 
chat with volunteers, rest in a warm place, and get some food, drinks and clothes.  
However, the controls did not manage to achieve their primary aim of preventing 
people from crossing the border, as it is admitted by Mario Deriu, secretary general of 
Bolzano’s branch of the Sindacato Italiano Unitario Lavoratori Polizia (SIULP – Italian 
Unitary Trade Union for Police Officers): “100% of those who try to cross the border 
succeed in the end” (Redattore Sociale 2015). As Weissensteiner also emphasises: 
 
As a matter of fact, controls are not successful in stopping people in Italy. They have simply 
made the journey longer, more difficult, more dangerous, more expensive, and more illegal; 
namely, by sometimes leaving people with the option of paying someone who is willing to 
take them beyond the border. 
(Weissensteiner 2015, p. 39) 
 
Therefore, the case of Brenner shows well how increased border controls do not 
block movements but rather keep “people caught in mobility and [transform] border-
regions into zones of heightened circulation” (Hess 2012, p. 436). As stressed by the 
quotes above, far from sealing the border, the strengthening of controls rather 
“irrationalises peoples’ movements as it interrupts their plans and trajectories and re-
directs peoples’ routeways” (Hess 2012, p. 436). 
 
6. Conclusion: beyond uneven geographies of reception and of EUrope 
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In the same way as the excess of reception discussed above, the excessive character of 
movements exposes the unevenness that characterises EUrope, thus contributing to the 
destabilisation of the image of homogeneity projected by the policies of harmonisation of 
reception conditions and relocation. With their movements, asylum seekers appropriate 
the EUropean space and operate as a “rating agency from below” (Heller et al, 2016, p. 
14) through which EU member states are assessed on the basis of the presumed living 
conditions and possibilities. By doing so, they disqualify countries that they consider not 
“EUropean” enough, as in the examples from Cabot and myself mentioned in section 4, 
thus drawing attention to the differences between living conditions, levels of 
development, rates of employment, salaries, and welfare provisions, which are inherent 
features of EUrope. Such “unevenness over space”, as Costis Hadjimichalis observes, “is 
not a mere sidebar to how capitalism works, but is fundamental to its reproduction” (2011, 
p. 255). In other words, these differences underscore the “neoliberal geographies of 
uneven development” (Brenner, 2003) that inform EUrope, reproducing and valorising 
unevenness rather than levelling it. If considered from the vantage point of the 
government of asylum seekers, unevenness seems to serve the interests of capital not only 
as a spatial strategy of uneven development, but also through the promotion of 
“illegalised” secondary movements, which can in turn be exploited and valorised in 
economic terms.  
 Besides emphasising EUrope’s uneven geographies, the excess of reception and 
the excessive character of movements point to possible ways for calling into question 
EUrope and radically rethinking it. Such an attempt should begin from a radical critique 
of two key aspects of the current configuration of EUrope, which I discussed in this article 
by focusing on the reception of asylum seekers: management of mobility and spatial 
unevenness. With respect to the first aspect, the emphasis on the excess of reception and 
on the excessive character of movements calls for moving beyond the current policy 
framework which attempts to govern the mobility of asylum seekers and beneficiaries of 
international protection through the Dublin system and the harmonisation of reception 
conditions. In this respect, to rethink Europe as an area of protection implies taking into 
consideration individual desires, expectations and family ties in the choice of the context 
of reception, thus rejecting any distribution mechanism that objectifies asylum seekers. 
In other words, this means giving asylum seekers the freedom to choose where to live in 
the common area of protection not only during the processing of the asylum claim, but 
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also after the granting of protection. In this regard, the mutual recognition of positive 
asylum decisions combined with the requirement for all member states to provide post-
recognition support measures to all beneficiaries of international protection would make 
the idea of a common area of protection more credible.  
As concerns the second aspect on spatial unevenness, this article has emphasised 
the entanglement between reception and the context in which it takes place, thus stressing 
the impossibility to detach the provision of reception from the broader social, housing, 
healthcare, and labour policies which constitute its setting. The analysis of the excess of 
reception drew attention to the unlikelihood of providing equivalent reception conditions 
in a space which is substantially uneven and fragmented like EUrope. In this respect, the 
attempt to create a common area of protection needs to be accompanied by a 
corresponding effort to reduce the unevenness which characterises EUrope. This can only 
be achieved by calling into question the neoliberal project which underpins the EU and 
by imagining Europe in terms in which unevenness is not exploited for capitalist interests, 
but rather tackled in order to provide a more equal access to possibilities for all. In this 
way, a critical examination of the homogeneous idea of EUrope that emerges from the 
CEAS provides an entry point for imagining a fairer and more equitable Europe, as a 
space which is truly smooth in terms of possibilities, living conditions, and welfare for 
everybody. 
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